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Abstract The brutal murder of James Byrd Jr. in June
1998 unleashed a storm of media, interest groups, high
proﬁle individuals and criticism on the Southeast Texas
community of Jasper. The crime and subsequent response—
from within the community as well as across the world—
engulfed the entire town in a collective trauma. Using
natural disaster literature/theory and employing an ecolog-
ical approach, Jasper, Texas was investigated via an inter-
rupted time series analysis to identify how the community
changed as compared to a control community (Center,
Texas) on crime, economic, health, educational, and social
capital measures collected at multiple pre- and post-crime
time points between 1995 and 2003. Differences-in-differ-
ences (DD) analysis revealed signiﬁcant post-event changes
in Jasper, as well as a surprising degree of resilience and
lack of negative consequences. Interviews with residents
conducted between March 2005 and 2007 identiﬁed how
the community responded to the crisis and augmented
quantitative ﬁndings with qualitative, ﬁeld-informed inter-
pretation. Interviews suggest the intervention of external
organizations exacerbated the severity of the events.
However, using strengths of speciﬁc local social institu-
tions—including faith based, law enforcement, media,
business sector and civic government organizations—the
community effectively responded to the initial threat and to
the potential negative ramiﬁcations of external entities.
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Introduction
Disasters, extreme events and collective traumas provide
situations that demand a multi-disciplinary response. After
such an experience, it is not difﬁcult to imagine ﬁgurative
and literal ripples spreading across the social landscape
affecting communities at every level. Undoubtedly, these
events impact the entire web of human endeavor including
economics, health, education, social order, infrastructure,
and the well-being of the individual, family and neigh-
borhood. The impact is not only short-term but may linger
into the future and have a profound effect on identity,
social relationships, and future policies. Clearly, these
phenomena require a sophisticated ecological analysis as
we seek to understand, analyze and prepare for future
negative events.
Further complicating research on disasters is a certain
amount of ambiguity mixed with expansiveness of the term
itself. Different kinds of natural disasters, such as earth-
quakes, ﬂoods and hurricanes, may be similarly destruc-
tive, but the latter two may offer forewarning that can lead
to possible preparation and evacuation. Collective disasters
may also include man-made events such as technological
accidents and purposeful terrorist activities. Tierney (1989)
has deﬁned disasters as ‘‘collective stress situations that
happen (or at least manifest themselves) relatively sud-
denly in a particular geographic area, involve some degree
of loss, interfere with the ongoing social life of the com-
munity, and are subject to human management’’ (p. 12).
The present study examined an incident that largely
qualiﬁes as a disaster according to Tierney’s (1989) deﬁ-
nition, but may most accurately be described as a ‘‘social
trauma’’. The June, 1998 murder of James Byrd Jr. in
Jasper, Texas had the potential to destroy an entire com-
munity both from immediate civil unrest and longer-term
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response research examines the individual as its stated or
implied unit of analysis (see, e.g., Norris et al. 2002b), the
present investigation of the impact of the Byrd murder
sought to measure the effect on and the response of the
community more broadly (cf. Wright et al. 1990).
The Community and the Trauma
Jasper, Texas is a rural city of over 8,000 people located
approximately 130 miles northeast of Houston. This Deep
South community is geographically isolated, ﬁtting many
regional cultural and demographic stereotypes: economi-
cally challenged, a manufacturing work force, high levels
of religious observance, and based on 2000 Census ﬁgures,
44% Black, 48% white, 8% of Hispanic origin, with edu-
cational levels signiﬁcantly below the state average (City-
Data.com 2004).
On June 6, 1998, James Byrd Jr., a 49 year-old African-
American, was walking home after attending a family
event. Three white men offered to give him a ride but the
cloaked gesture became apparent as they assaulted, sav-
agely beat and chained him to their pick-up truck, even-
tually dragging him to his death. The trauma besetting the
community grew intense in the days after the murder, as
the severity of the crime quickly ignited a political, social
and media storm that gripped Jasper. The world’s attention
and condemnation focused on the town, as it was inundated
by national and international media. The FBI investigated;
interest groups representing racial fringes set up camp
inside town limits. The Black Panthers arrived, armed and
in combat fatigues, and high proﬁle personalities (e.g.,
Jessie Jackson) descended on the community, intent on
making Jasper and the heinous event a rallying point for
their respective agendas. In the middle of this, the com-
munity struggled to control its own destiny, its identity, and
the safety of its citizens. Normal life came to a halt as
Jasper attempted to respond to the world’s reaction to the
crime.
While individuals and organizations from outside des-
cended on Jasper, most residents avoided the public rallies
sponsored by external entities. Instead, residents displayed
yellow ribbons in sympathy and in token of peace. Resi-
dents and relatives of the killers vocally decried the mur-
der. More than 1,000 people joined in a prayer vigil of
reconciliation. Commercial, social and political normalcy
was disrupted as all activity centered on the crime and the
storm that followed.
The Present Study
Our ecological analysis of the Byrd crime examined the
community level response to a murder that escalated into a
social crisis. Building on theories developed in natural
disaster research and borrowing several core constructs as a
starting point to comprehend this ‘‘social disaster’’, we
utilized a time series design and DD analysis to explore the
ecology of Jasper’s response to this event by examining
crime, economic, education, medical and social capital
measures. While we desired the objectivity and statistical
comparison provided by these quantitative measures, we
also sought detail and insight that might not be available
except through in-depth interviews and so semi-structured
interviews supplemented the quantitative data collection.
Thus, our study included both quantitative and qualitative
methods, a convention particularly suited to understanding
the complex and multi-faceted nature of community and
disaster.
The natural disaster literature suggested that Jasper’s
response would display an initial surge of cooperation,
unity and altruism within the community (cf., Kaniasty and
Norris 1993, 1995, 1999; Raphael 1986). Prior research
indicates that victims serve as their own best responders
and resources (Dynes and Drabek 1994; Gist et al. 1998),
leading to a tendency to look within for ‘‘deliverance’’ as
well as for a marshalling of resources (Wenger 1985). High
levels of mutual helping often materialize, and previous
community conﬂicts recede. Race, ethnic and social class
barriers crumble, at least temporarily, during this stage of
‘‘post-disaster Utopia’’ (Bolin 1989; Drabek 1986; Eranen
and Liebkind 1993). Scenarios of heightened communal
cooperation are theorized to have ‘‘therapeutic features’’,
including the possibility of taking the community ‘‘beyond
its pre-existing levels of integration, productivity and
capacity for growth’’ (Fritz 1961, p. 692; Quarantelli
1985). Thus, we hypothesized an initial strengthening of
social groups and a general strengthening of networks
between formal and informal social groups. Research also
indicates that short-term responses are frequently followed
by a ‘‘second disaster’’ once the immediate threat passes
and life returns to a sense of normalcy (Raphael 1986).
This may include the reemergence of pre-crisis psychoso-
cial tensions and ﬁssures that had been hidden in the
immediate post-disaster phase, as well as longer-term
effects on the mental health of individuals (see, e.g., Norris
et al. 2002a, b) that would play out in changes in the
community over time. Thus, we anticipated that negative
effects of the crime would ripple through the community
and show up in both subtle and explicit ways in the sub-
sequent years.
Methods
This study was designed in two distinct but cumulative
phases. The ﬁrst was a quantitative analysis employing a
234 Am J Community Psychol (2009) 44:233–248
123wide variety of community-level measures to ascertain the
character of the community both before and after the crime.
Surveying the community across a large number of social
indicators was enlarged by the second, qualitative phase,
using interviews conducted by the ﬁrst author to explore
the effects on and reaction by the community in a more
open-ended fashion. Each phase is described below.
Quantitative Phase
We used an interrupted time series design to examine
indications of the changes in the community resulting from
the murder. This was accomplished by collecting a variety
of community measures touching a breadth of sectors.
Raudenbush and Sampson (1999) suggest the need to
develop ‘‘ecometric measures’’ as community level paral-
lels to ‘‘psychometrics’’ at the individual level. These
measures can more accurately capture the ecological con-
dition of the community as a unit in its own right, rather
than constructs that are merely aggregates of individual
ones. We pursued a methodological assessment of human
ecological settings such as neighborhoods and communi-
ties. The variables examined conformed to several guiding
principles: (a) the variables measured community (eco-
metric) behavior as much as possible, rather than being an
aggregate of psychometrics, (b) the variables tapped sev-
eral aspects of the community (e.g., crime, commerce,
social), and (c) the variables are practical and generally
obtainable in most communities. The goal was to secure a
community-wide (by geography and sociologic segment)
perspective of any potential changes. A smaller subset of
similar measures was used by Golec (1980), Fowler (2001),
and Pennebaker and Banasik (1997) after various social
disasters. This phase of research followed the model and
logic of the methodology utilized by Putnam (2000) in his
study of social capital by examining trends in civic par-
ticipation in organizations, leagues and other social groups.
Our goal was to cast a wide net, including focusing on
several of these concepts, to survey a range of community
measures in an attempt to see what, if anything, had
changed in the community in the aftermath of the Byrd
murder.
The ﬁve quantitative constructs identiﬁed included
‘‘crime’’, ‘‘economics’’, ‘‘education’’, ‘‘health’’ and ‘‘social
capital’’. When possible, several measures were used to
evaluate each construct. Violent crime, domestic disputes
and driving under the inﬂuence citations were collected as
measures of ‘‘Crime’’. The ‘‘Economic’’ effect was mea-
sured with number of houses sold, construction tax, retail
tax and lodging tax revenues. School attendance was the
sole reliable measure for ascertaining the effect on ‘‘Edu-
cation’’. Hospital admissions, births, suicides and mental
health caseload comprised the ‘‘Medical’’ construct.
‘‘Social capital’’ was assessed in this study as the number
of marriages and divorces.
Archival data were collected from an assortment of
public records and from diverse sources, including formal
public ﬁlings, real-estate ﬁgures, organization budgets,
hospital records, crime data and economic reports. Com-
munity level data were collected at multiple pre- and post-
crime time points surrounding June, 1998. Statistics from
the years between 1995 and 2003 were recorded to capture
trends both before and after the event (resulting in 108
observation points; 42 months before and 66 months after
the murder). Data were obtained from local hospitals,
county records, uniform crime reports, sheriff’s ofﬁces,
school districts and Texas department of vital statistics.
Local employees and record keepers were extremely
helpful in aggregating the speciﬁc data from public records.
Monthly data, as opposed to yearly, were collected when-
ever possible. This permitted more accurate, granular level
capture of trends and effects that might otherwise have
been lost through via aggregated annual data.
Observations were designed around a non-manipulated
(i.e., unexpected and unplanned) treatment/event—the
crime—and as such renders traditional experimental con-
trols impossible. This fact, as well as the inability to control
for changes in the independent variables (crime rates, tax
revenues, hospital admissions, marriages, etc.) by experi-
mental design, led to the selection of a control community
to use as an analytic control. Criteria for the control
community included similarity in terms of geographic
region, population size, ethnic composition and economics.
Center, Texas ﬁt this logical and demographic similarity
and served as the control community in the interrupted time
series design. Table 1 provides a demographic comparison
of Jasper and Center, but beyond these, the communities
have comparable cultural, historical and economic quali-
ties. Both are rural, relatively isolated communities that are
heavily dependent on tourism and the logging industry. All
Table 1 Treatment and control community demographics
City Jasper, TX Center, TX
Population 8,247 5,678
Median age (years) 37.3 36.9
Median household income $30,902 $29,112
Per capita income $15,636 $15,186
Racial demographics
Caucasian (%) 45.7 46.7
Hispanic (%) 8.6 18.1
Black (%) 43.9 34.2
Other (%) 5.2 11.1
University/college No No
County seat Yes Yes
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control community.
The DD approach is a useful analytic tool perfectly
suited to estimate causal relationships when several years
of pre- and post-event data are available (Meyer and
Blanchﬂower 1994). DD estimation consists of identifying
a speciﬁc intervention (or treatment) in time-series designs
and has grown in popularity in econometric and policy
evaluation scenarios (see Freeman 2007; Kreft and Epling
2007; Kuziemko 2006). The DD method is ideal for lon-
gitudinal analysis when isolating signiﬁcant effects in
interrupted time series and similar designs. This analytic
approach compares the difference in outcomes after and
before the intervention (or treatment) for groups affected
by it to this difference for unaffected groups. Together with
the use of a control community, the DD analysis controls
for cyclical and regional variables that might confound the
ﬁndings. Compared against a sufﬁciently similar control
community, the DD analysis identiﬁes whether trends
changed, as well as the statistical signiﬁcance of those
changes. It is useful in identifying change only, not nec-
essarily correlation or causation between the change and
the treatment. The DD analysis was used to compare the
difference between the change (difference) in pre-murder
to post-murder (June 1998) rates for the various crime,
economic, education, health and social capital measures in
both Jasper and Center, Texas. This statistical method was
applied to each of the dependent variables. With a com-
munity acting as a control and the methodological strengths
of pre- and post-measures inherent in a time series design,
this method is extremely robust.
Analytic Strategy
An Ordinary Least Squares regression of the change in
average violent crime (or other crime, economic, health,
education and social capital measures) regressed on a set of
dummy variables were used to determine whether any of
the pre- to post-crisis differences between Jasper (treatment
community) and Center (control community) were signif-
icant. The following model is estimated for measures in the
treatment community and the control community:
y ¼ d0 þ d1jas þ d2post þ d3jaspost
For the Jasper crime, y is the change in variable rates
(violent crime, hospital admits, marriage licenses, etc.) for
the ‘‘pre’’ (January 1995–June 1998) and ‘‘post’’ (July
1998–December 2003) time frame. The control community
(Center), by deﬁnition, does not experience the community
trauma/crisis. The dummy variable ‘‘jas’’ captures the
violent crime rate between Jasper and Center (the control),
regardless of the time period. ‘‘Post’’ captures changes in
violent crime from pre- to post-crisis. ‘‘Jaspost’’ is the
difference in time and place between the control and
treatment and as such is the ‘‘Differences in Differences’’
effect.
Qualitative Phase
Personal, in-depth interviews were conducted to ﬁll out the
picture of the Jasper community’s response to this event.
While quantitative data examined changes up to 5 years
post-murder, the interviews were conducted approximately
7 years after the event, between March 2005 and 2007.
This stage of the project involved interviewing 15 people
representing a variety of segments of the community.
These individuals were members of the community before,
during, and after the event, and included the mayor, police
chief and sheriff, religious and minority group leaders,
businessmen, relatives and neighbors of the victim, among
others. Interviewees were chosen because of their promi-
nence and active participation in the community response.
Participants were solicited for involvement in the research
and given a straightforward explanation as to the intent of
the interview (e.g., to identify how the community
responded and reacted after the Byrd murder). Interviews
were taped recorded.
The interviews were built on a series of semi-structured,
open-ended questions, allowing for further elaboration or
probes as the research unfolded. Questions were framed
along a number of general categories including: general
effect of the crime/trauma, community response, and
individual reaction. The interviews provided insight to in-
terviewees’ assessments of the community’s response to
the event, what the community did to cope in response,
assessments of the fairness of media coverage, conﬁdence
and trust in community institutions, including the police,
city government, the media, church leaders, community
organizers (both inside and outside groups), race relations
and tolerance of minorities, and attributions for what
accounted for the event and its aftermath.
Results
Quantitative Findings
Crime
A combination of FBI uniform crime measures, in addition
to locally obtained Driving under the Inﬂuence (DUI)
infractions and jail population, were used to ascertain the
change in crime in Jasper as compared to the control
community, Center. The DD analysis is shown in Table 2.
The rate of violent crime in Jasper after the Byrd murder
was signiﬁcantly different (p\.0001) than the rate of
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crimes after the event (compared to pre-event) in the
magnitude of 254.52 violent crimes per 100,000 people.
Figure 1 presents a visual representation of the DD statis-
tical analysis, and shows the average monthly violent crime
rates of both Jasper and Center before and after the event.
While average monthly violent crime decreased in Center
after the Byrd murder, it increased in Jasper. Examination
of the ﬁrst 12 months immediately following the murder
(July 1998–June 1999, as illustrated in Fig. 2) revealed no
increase or decrease from the previous trend in Jasper, nor
compared, over the same time frame, to the control com-
munity. Jasper’s increase in violent crime took place during
the ﬁve and a half years following the event. Moreover, the
changing dynamics of post-event violent crime trends
occurred after the ﬁrst 12 months and, therefore, outside
the immediate impact stage of the event, as would be
expected after the ‘‘altruistic community’’ dissipated into a
‘‘second disaster’’, as explained by Raphael (1986).
Compared to Center, the rate of incarceration (i.e., ‘‘Jail
Population’’) in Jasper increased signiﬁcantly (p\.0001)
after the event. As with violent crime, the trend in the
immediate 6 months following the event was down, indi-
cating a reduction in this crime measure during the impact
and immediate post-impact (the emergence of the ‘‘altru-
istic community’’) stages. This temporary reduction was
offset by increases in the jail population in the ensuing
years.
The slope in DUI citations changed from pre- to post-
event. The coefﬁcients manifest signiﬁcant (p\.0001)
slope differences in Jasper compared to Center (-37.95)
and from pre-event and post-event (45.42). The rate of DUI
citations changed after the murder in Jasper, but less than
what was expected. As with the other crime constructs, the
change in the slope of DUI citations did not occur until
12–18 months after the event (see Fig. 3). Furthermore,
there is no corresponding increase in DUI citations in
Jasper during a period of dramatically increased DUI
Table 2 Differences-in-
differences estimates for Jasper,
Texas measures
a p\.05,
b p\.005,
c p\.001
Coefﬁcients Differences-in-differences
effect
Place diff. Time diff.
Crime measures
Violent crime -429.35
c -169.03
c 254.52
c
Domestic disputes -38.55
c -5.53 7.65
DUI -37.95
c 45.42
c -26.02
a
Jail population -542.94
c -139.39
c 317.44
c
Economic measures
Houses sold 0.0081
c 0.0008 -.0022
b
Construction tax -60.45 -34.54 56.36
Retail sales tax 135.24 352.25 89.91
Lodging tax 7.59
c 1.69 -0.71
Education measure
School attendance -0.2659 2.2387 -0.1968
Health measures
Hospital admissions 0.0000585 0.0049357
c -0.003657
c
Births -0.0005854
a 0.0005923
b -0.000101
Suicide 0.0000122 -0.00000808 0.0000027
Mental health -0.0127
c -0.00684
c 0.00409
c
Social capital measures
Marriage -0.0000293 0.0001497 0.0000203
Divorce 0.0004659
b -0.0008759
c 0.0011073
c
Fig. 1 Pre- and post-event violent crime averages in Center and
Jasper
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1998–July 1999) the Byrd murder.
The most intimate measure of criminality used in this
study, domestic disputes, showed no signiﬁcant change
before and after the event. While there was a difference in
rates between Jasper and Center, the DD analysis did not
manifest a signiﬁcant change over time between the two
towns. The p-value (p = .407) suggests that the difference
was not signiﬁcant—that is, that the pre-post difference in
Jasper was not different from the pre-post difference in
Center. The crime did not result in higher or lower
domestic dispute rates.
The Economy
The Jasper economy was driven by tourism, retirement
relocation and the timber industry. Two of these three had
the potential to be negatively impacted due to the stigma
(e.g., Jasper as a racist, red-neck place) associated with the
crime. Economic reality was measured by number of
houses sold, construction tax, retail sales tax and lodging
tax revenues. DD analysis was used to examine the change,
if any, in the economic performance of the community
before versus after the Byrd murder. Table 2 lists the dif-
ferences between Jasper and Center, before and after the
murder and the DD effect.
Houses Sold Jasper had a higher, per capita, number of
houses sold than Center throughout the entire time of
investigation (see Fig. 4). In fact, the rate of houses sold is
not signiﬁcantly different than zero from before to after the
event. However, when comparing the difference between
Jasper and Center from pre- to post-event, the rates of sales
were slightly less than expected. This signiﬁcant (p\.005)
Fig. 3 Monthly DUI incidents
in Jasper and Center 1995–2003
Fig. 2 Monthly violent crime
incidents in Jasper and Center
1995–2003
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housing market.
Construction, Retail Sales and Lodging Tax Revenues Each
of these tax revenue measures displayed no signiﬁcant DD
effect. This means that the rates of tax revenues per capita
were not different from before June 1998 than their levels
after June 1998. The event had little measurable economic
effect when measured by tax revenues.
Education Effects
Educational measures are generally very difﬁcult to obtain
since most are compiled only on an annual basis (stan-
dardized test scores, graduation rates, college enrollment,
etc.). This proved problematic when looking for changes
occurring on a monthly or quarterly basis. Fortunately,
Center and Jasper maintained attendance records for public
schools. This single measure became our quantitative
indicator. When evaluating pre- to post-event change, the
coefﬁcients in the DD table (Table 2) revealed that the
slight drop in attendance in Jasper was not signiﬁcant. It
appears that educational behavior—in terms of school
attendance—was not negatively affected by the crime.
Health Effects
While not comprehensive, hospital admissions, births,
suicides and mental health caseloads provided insight to
help determine if the murder had some effect on the health
of citizens. Table 2 presents the DD results for the health
variables. The coefﬁcients are stated in terms of per capita
comparisons.
Hospital Admissions A statistically signiﬁcant DD coef-
ﬁcient of -.003657 (p\.001) indicates that hospital
admissions in the months following the event decreased
compared to before the event and compared to the control
community. Figure 5 displays monthly rates with trend
lines added for Jasper pre-event (R
2 = .215) and post-event
Fig. 4 Houses sold in Jasper
and Center 1995–2003
Fig. 5 Hospital admission rates
in Jasper and Center 1995–2003
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2 = .1067). Trend lines for Center are also displayed to
illustrate Jasper’s differential trend from the control, as
well as from its own pre-crisis rate. This is another way of
visually demonstrating the DD effect.
Births Following the murder, birth rates did not show any
increase or decrease relative to pre-event rates and the
control community. While there were slight signiﬁcant
changes between communities, as well as an increase in
post-event rates, the DD effect was not signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent than zero. Figure 6 illustrates that births in both
communities increased slightly from pre- to post-event
time periods, but the relative change was nearly constant.
Suicides There was minimal change in suicide rates
between time periods (pre- or post-event), and there were
very few differences between communities. The DD effect
(.0000273, p = .908) was not signiﬁcant, reﬂecting the fact
that this event did not correspond with either an increase or
a decrease in suicides.
Mental Health The data displays a trend of gradually
declining number of mental health clients per capita over
the period of study. This trend in Jasper is mirrored by the
same trend in Center. The signiﬁcant difference between
Jasper and Center and between pre and post-event time
periods are evident from the coefﬁcients in Table 2, as well
as in Fig. 7. The DD effect of .00409 (p\.001) is small
but signiﬁcant. These data indicate that the per capita
number of mental health patients after the crime was higher
than what would be expected by the control community
and pre-event trends (see Fig. 8). While the number of
mental health patients fell in both communities after the
crime, the drop in Jasper was not as precipitous as in
Center. In other words, the decrease in mental health
patients was not as large as expected.
Social Capital Effects
Marriage and divorce tap into the fundamental unit of
community (the family) and are ultimate measures of the
trust, functionality, reciprocity and cohesion of that unit.
Table 2 contains the DD analysis results for marriages and
divorces, the two measures of social capital examined.
Fig. 6 Pre- and post-event birth rate averages in Jasper and Center
Fig. 7 Mental health clients in
Jasper and Center 1995–2003
Fig. 8 Pre- and post-event mental health client averages in Jasper
and Center
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indicates Jasper’s lower marriage rate independent of pre- or
post-event time periods. The ‘‘Time Difference’’ coefﬁcient
(.0001497)describestheincreaseinbothcommunities’post-
event marriage rates. Neither of these was signiﬁcant.
Divorce The post-event divorce rate in Jasper increased
signiﬁcantly (p\.001) beyond pre-event levels. This
increase, as indicated by the DD Effect coefﬁcient
(.0011073), exceeded what the trend in the control com-
munity estimated. Figure 9 provides an illustration of this
change. As can be seen, the divorce rate in Center
decreased from the pre-event to post-event period. During
the same periods, Jasper’s divorce rate increased.
Qualitative Findings
Interviews revealed several core themes as Jasper respon-
ded to the crisis following the Byrd murder. While some
themes overlap with the quantitative ﬁndings, the inter-
views helped identify phenomena and trends that might
otherwise have escaped notice. Interviewees identiﬁed the
role of local social institutions, the importance of com-
munication, the inﬂuence of the media, community self-
reliance, economic challenges, and the importance of
reserves of social capital in crisis. Each of these will be
considered in turn.
Proximate Primary Social Institutions
The crime and community trauma commanded the con-
centrated attention of Jasper’s primary formal and informal
social organizations. Not only did these groups perform
their own function, but they also joined in unprecedented
cooperation throughout the course of the recovery period.
Community leaders developed a strategy and deﬂated the
potential negative effects of outside interest groups. Spe-
ciﬁc responses were made on the ﬂy, but the leaders and
groups involved were established early on. Equally
important, relationships between these groups took shape
early, permitting venues to determine actions to speciﬁc
challenges.
The group with the most ubiquitous presence in the lives
of community members was the Ministerial Alliance—a
group of ministers from the various churches who had, for
years, created a network that crossed racial, economic and
religious lines to serve as an informal social resource for
this highly religious community. They possessed the trust
of both the average citizens as well as other prominent
institutions, including law enforcement and the business
community. At the invitation of the Sheriff and the Mayor,
the entire Ministerial Alliance was quickly tapped to take
on a central role. One of the ministers recalled, ‘‘There was
so much misinformation in our community that the Mayor
and law enforcement came to our meeting and told us
everything they knew—and it was amazing what they told
us. And they wanted us to get out into the community (and
communicate) the truth as they knew it at that time….W e
were welcome to go to the Mayor’s and Sheriff’s ofﬁce
whenever we wanted. He shared with us everything he
knew. He trusted us and, in return, we trusted him’’.
The Minister’s Alliance jointly identiﬁed protective
responses to the wave of outsiders who came into their
community, and was brought completely into the circle of
decision makers. The Ministerial Alliance thus assumed a
central role in every aspect of the community response.
Communication
Clear, accurate, timely and ongoing communication to
members of the community was a primary objective and
required continual concerted effort. Community leaders in
Jasper quickly recognized the importance of communica-
tion with residents. From the earliest stages of the event,
miscommunication threatened to spread fear throughout
the community.
Jasper leaders instituted a line of communication
through the Ministerial Alliance, which became the
mouthpiece to the community. Very little ﬁltering took
place from the police to members of the Ministerial Alli-
ance, and this candid communication also extended to the
media. The Sheriff’s ofﬁce freely shared information in an
effort to pre-empt speculation and false reporting. This
strategy also won the favor of the media.
In the midst of the trauma, Jasper leaders were uniﬁed in
the messages they sent. Messages, instructions and strategy
employed by law enforcement, the city, and the Ministerial
Alliance were communicated in coordination and alignment
with one another. Residents did not receive competing
messages. Instruction to close shops and to avoid downtown
during rallies sponsored by the KKK or the Black Panthers,
Fig. 9 Pre- and post-event divorce averages in Jasper and Center
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bytheMayorandemphasizedbypersonalvisitsbymembers
of the Ministerial Alliance.
Information was transmitted to the general community
through the traditional outlets, including press conferences,
newspaper and local radio. Jasper also employed more
intimate means, such as ministers communicating with
church congregations. Non-traditional information outlets
combined raw information with a level of personalization
and trust by virtue of the recipient’s relationship with the
communicator.
Media
The media descended upon Jasper and left a lasting impact
on the town. The media was much more involved than an
unbiased spectator. Evidence of sensationalism, disrespect
for the community’s wishes, and incorrect and inaccurate
representations, are easy to identify. The negative stigma
associated with Jasper is a result, to some degree, of the
media. Leaders and individuals obliged to interact with
the media quickly learned to be cautious, if not to avoid the
media outright. They also identiﬁed ways to manage the
media and even employed strategies to win the media over.
Both black and white interviewees spoke of a common
theme. ‘‘When the national media got here they were
making us to be pop bellied, snuff dippin’, beer drinking
red necks, east-Texas bigoted police. Ignorant, unedu-
cated…Typical stereotypes’’. This view of the media
extended into every segment of society. A black minister
evaluated their motives as well as their gradual evolution:
They came looking for a red-neck, prejudiced com-
munity. A community that was vilifying each other.
A community that was for racism. A community that
was not together. This was going to be their example,
I guess, of what the whole South was like, of what
east-Texas was like.
Citizens recognized that they were not entirely free of the
cloudofracialinequalitythatwasbeingcastovertheirtown.
Many recognized that the national media was creating an
injury that would not easily be rectiﬁed, ‘‘The injury to the
communitywasintheinstantperceptiontherestoftheworld
had about Jasper.… The headline all the way across the two
pages in inch and a half type said ‘The Town that Shamed
America’.TheAustinAmericanStatesmanhadastoryabout
what a racist town this was, that it was a beehive or Klan
activity. I had never seen evidence of any Klan activity’’.
Jasper was ill equipped to handle the media immersion
brought on by the heinous crime. This applied not only to
their ability to mount a public relations campaign to answer
the media portrayal as a racist, red-neck bastion but more
simply to adjust to the quantity of news crews inundating
their otherwise quiet town. In the small community of
5,000 people, the swarm of media was literally like an
invasion. ‘‘We had never seen any of this before. There
were news trucks taking up the whole courthouse square,
double trucked with news trucks from all over the world’’.
Jasper’s interaction with the media can be described as
measured trepidation at best. The president of the Minis-
terial Alliance said ‘If you men don’t talk to these reporters
someone’s going to talk to them.’ And there were lots of
people coming from out of town who wanted some pub-
licity who were making up all kinds of stories who did not
know fact from ﬁction…. So we began doing them. As for
those who were not spokespersons, the Mayor advised, ‘‘‘If
you don’t know what to say, don’t talk.’ We ﬁnally got that
message out to the people.’’
Leaders involved in the response learned and adjusted
positively to the reality of the situation. The Sheriff’s
relationship with the media began on tenuous grounds but
was ﬂipped almost completely around by an ingenious but
gutsy decision by the Sheriff. Going against established
practices of all other law enforcement agencies, including
consulting FBI representatives, he pursued a path of com-
munication that changed the media dynamics by making
allies out of initial adversaries:
In Texas the media has a right to have a copy (of the
afﬁdavit of probably cause) but they have to request it
in writing and you have ten days to respond…we
didn’t make them wait, they didn’t even have to ask
for it…that was something very smart because the
press went from stereotyping us as one way (to)
setting down with us.
This course of action was in harmony with the Sheriff’s
larger commitment to open communication that involved
the Byrd Family, the Ministerial Alliance and now the
media. This offering, demonstrating a willingness to work
with the news media, began to win them away from their
preconceived stance. ‘‘We found that the longer the people
stayed in town the more honest they became in their
reporting because they really saw who we were. We wer-
en’t this phony community who was putting on a show
while they were there. They really expected to ﬁnd a town
that was ﬁlled with hatred and we weren’t that way’’.
Unfortunately one of the characteristics of the news media
is a short-term focus. News bites and surface level evalu-
ations, both of which are limited by time or space, did not
serve the sophisticated nature of Jasper’s culture.
Extra-Community Interest Groups
In Jasper, the national and international media ﬁrmly
established themselves as an interest group pursuing, in the
eyes of the community, an agenda as self-serving as any of
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degree their presence attracted other groups who sought a
stage to proclaim their ideology. The mayor summed up
the challenge, ‘‘Media kept coming in. Black Panthers,
KKK, NAACP all came in. NAACP came in and had a
meeting. Groups did not come in to help, (but) only
because the media was there and provided coverage’’.
As with the media, these groups came with their own
ideas of how Jasper should respond and what the murder
should represent. Jasper leaders recognized that these
agendas frequently did not match their own, ‘‘Different
agendas were coming in that were trying to over ride ours.
We had to confront those. We had a differing opinion (from
the outside groups) of what we should do as a community.
That was our primary objective, to focus on keeping peace
and harmony in the community. Speaking as one and not
having any divisions between white and black’’.
The Ministerial Alliance took center stage running
interference and providing a buffer against these outside
groups. They were clear and uniﬁed in their agenda,
desiring peace and healing in their community. ‘‘You look
at the outside inﬂuences that come into any commu-
nity…we realized that this was our problem. We had to
provide the solutions to it—the long term solutions after
the media had packed their bags and trucks and the lights
and cameras were gone, and after Al Sharpton and Jessie
Jackson and Kueze Enfume and all those folks who showed
up…the local community people realized that this was our
community’’. Jasper became host to the cadre of contem-
porary black leaders. The Ku Klux Klan and Black Pan-
thers came quickly thereafter and the political environment
became potentially explosive and violent.
As each group or individual arrived in Jasper, the Min-
isters, the Sheriff and the Mayor determined the individual
or groups best equipped to confront the arriving group.
Summing up this strategy a community leader explained,
‘‘When the Panthers came, the black leadership listened to
them and met them and talked to them. And when the KKK
came, the white leaders did exactly the same thing’’. It was
determined that black ministers were the best counter to
inﬂuential personalities. ‘‘(They) confronted Jessie Jackson
and Al Sharpton because as ministers we felt that the black
ministers had to confront the black people and we (white
ministers) had to confront the white people. That was very
helpful’’. The Sheriff, who had his own groups to keep in
check, remarked about the effectiveness of this strategy,
‘‘That put Jessie Jackson and Al Sharpton’s ﬁre out. It was a
non-issue. They did not stay very long’’.
The Economy
The gruesome murder and negative media spotlight posed a
serious challenge for the already fragile economic climate.
The events threatened to harm the entire community as
explained, ‘‘We were injured, although it hit the Byrds, all
of us were injured, both the white and black community.
This is a place where tourists come. People from Houston
and Dallas come to Jasper on the weekend. In 1999 we had
that stigma on us…they just stayed away. It hurt us eco-
nomically too. No one wants to locate a company in a racist
state’’. Economic conditions became a focal point for the
response of the Mayor. He described the effect: ‘‘The
community was hurt because we had a mark, a mark of
hate. It hurt us for a while. We lost some business that was
going to move here. At that time we were on the up rise
with bringing business in. It did hurt’’.
While difﬁcult to measure quantitatively, especially in
terms of opportunity costs, community leaders who were in
a position to know explained: ‘‘there were some doctors
who (had previously accepted positions) who chose not to
come. There were some companies who were going to
move-in and they chose not to come. Lots of houses went
up for sale…people were ashamed to say they were from
Jasper. No matter where we went, if you said you were
from Jasper people would remember (the Byrd murder)’’.
To respond to the stigma and try to counter the effects,
the community and the state implemented several efforts
directly aimed at the economic rehabilitation of the city.
The Governor sent an economic development expert to the
local Council of Governments ofﬁce and unrolled ‘‘An
Economic Development Strategic Plan for Jasper, Texas’’.
The economic development position remained in Jasper for
more than 5 years after the trauma. The Mayor also orga-
nized a taskforce that focused on the economic challenges
of the community. While Jasper residents identiﬁed nega-
tive ramiﬁcations of the murder, they engaged in previ-
ously unprecedented responses to address their economic
status. The conscious addressing of economic disparities
within the community and the establishment of an eco-
nomic development ofﬁce with a strategic plan customized
for Jasper were viewed as positive outcomes of the event.
Preparation and Social Capital
As noted, the Ministerial Alliance represented the most
trusted and most ubiquitous social institution in the com-
munity. Even prior to the crisis events, this institution
permeated the lives of members of the community. It was
locally based, locally led and shared the burden and ben-
eﬁts of the events. It was intimately familiar with the
culture, needs, assets and potential consequences of the
community. The Ministerial Alliance was a repository of
social capital, generating strong connections between res-
idents across segments of the community.
Thesingleinstitutionthatprovidedthelargestsocialtieto
the majority of the citizenry is the church. The Ministerial
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enough to understand cultural speciﬁcs, possessed the trust
of the community, and had essential communication,
resource and support channels in place. Of particular
importance was its inter-connection with many, if not all, of
the other institutions and segments of the community. Cen-
tral to an effective and health community response, it pos-
sessed sufﬁcient clout to inﬂuence the entire community.
Pre-existing social networks and cross-institutional
working relationships provided an essential foundation for
effective responses. In Jasper, leaders had taken speciﬁc
steps years before the Byrd murder and subsequent trauma
to reach out and establish social ties with diverse groups
that would, unknown at these early times, come together in
a necessary congealed fashion to provide sufﬁcient
response to a dire crisis. For example, the Ministerial
Alliance had frequently worked with the city and with
schools on economic and social matters. Most importantly,
the Ministerial Alliance crossed racial divisions. When a
racially-based crime took place and the community was
confronted with an opportunity to split along racial lines,
the strength of the Ministerial Alliance networks between
white and black ministers was stronger than racial afﬁnity.
Both black and white ministers viewed the collective health
of the Jasper community more important than their
respective racial groups. The trust built with these groups
proved vital when the crisis struck unexpectedly and
escalated. Instead of being split and adversarial, these
groups worked together, often reciprocally sharing and
building on the unique strengths each brought to the table
to fashion a mutually beneﬁcial response.
Strong social ties were especially important with regard
to the immediate families of the victims. The relationship
between the community and immediate relatives of the
primary victims developed into a relatively amiable and
mutually supportive manner. This was not simply a matter
of chance but began with appropriate—in message, mes-
senger and timeliness—efforts by the community. The
Byrds developed strong friendships and trust with the lar-
ger community.
The relationship between the Byrds and the Jasper
community (facilitated through the Sheriff’s ofﬁce) is an
excellent example of the beneﬁts sometimes deﬁned as
‘‘social capital’’. Trust was established early on by the
personal visit of the Sheriff. This relationship became the
basis for the Black community’s assurance that justice
would be carried out. The Byrds’ calming inﬂuence and
refusal to allow retribution and hate take root along racial
lines is a reciprocal measure that cannot be understated. If
the Byrds had reacted otherwise, the nature of the trauma in
Jasper could likely have resulted in violence and years of
racial malice. Instead the Byrds supported the community
and the community reciprocally supported the Byrds.
Discussion
Interviews revealed several speciﬁc responses as well as
strategies employed by the community of Jasper, Texas to
respond to the murder of James Byrd and its aftermath.
These included building upon existing trust in the religious
community—the most prominent local social institution,
designing an effective response to external interest groups,
and managing the media. The ﬁve quantitative constructs
that were examined displayed some evidence of change
and some evidence of post-event status quo. While the DD
analysis could not establish a clear causal connection
between the Byrd murder and the changes seen following
the crime, it did help identify elements of the community
where change occurred from pre-event levels as compared
to the control community.
Speciﬁcally, our analysis identiﬁed several ‘‘negative’’
changes in Jasper in the months and years following the
murder. The divorce rate increased and the housing market
(as measured the number of houses sold) softened; both are
negative indicators of community well-being. Jasper also
experienced an increase in violent crime and in its jail
population. While the results seem to indicate that Jasper
changed for the worse after the Byrd murder, the larger
picture presented by the data suggests a remarkable degree
of resilience in the form of a lack of effect. More variables
displayed no change (either increased or decreased) after
the murder than displayed change. For example, lodging
taxes, retail sales and construction tax revenues did not
appear to suffer; only one of the three indicators used to
measure economic health showed a decrease after the
murder. General community well-being was also manifest
in other segments as well: public school attendance did not
change after the murder and domestic disputes showed no
signs of change from earlier levels.
This study purposefully employed an ecological point of
view for ascertaining the effect on the community. Not
only did it tap into the various segments that make up
‘‘community’’, but also within those constructs we
attempted to obtain several variables. This provided a sense
of context in which to examine ﬁndings. To illustrate this
effect, we can review the crime results in Jasper. Two
variables indicated an increase in post-event crime, one
described a decrease and one described a condition of no
change. It is difﬁcult, therefore, to conclude that crime
increased in Jasper after the Byrd murder (see also Pride-
more et al. 2008, who found no change in monthly homi-
cide rates after the Oklahoma City bombing and the
September 11 terrorist attacks).
In addition to longitudinal changes in crime, economics,
education, health and social capital measures, in-depth
interviews revealed that the community recognized
immediate ramiﬁcations of the crime and responded by
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The universal response from individuals involved at vari-
ous levels included the confession, ‘‘It has affected me
drastically’’. One example of this effect, manifesting itself
in both quantitative and qualitative examination, was the
impact of the murder on the economy. DD statistical
analysis revealed a signiﬁcant change in pre- to post-crime
housing sales. Interviews provided collaboration to the
negative economic consequences for the city and provided
additional detail about the nature of the effect (decisions of
businesses and key professionals not to relocate to Jasper in
light of the stigma associated with the crime). The contri-
bution of multiple methods to a richer and more accurate
understanding of the situation is further evidence for the
need for an ecologically-oriented approach to this issue.
The Importance of Primary Social Institutions
The role of local primary social institutions cannot be
understated in the response to a community crisis. The
power of local institutions to mobilize, to calm, to direct
their own communities, may provide a model and cause a
reevaluation of the role of outside rescue agencies and
current procedures during disasters and extreme events.
Primary proximate social institutions pre-dated the crisis,
shared a vested interest in the community, understood
important cultural elements of the area, and will remain
with the affected population long after the crisis has pas-
sed. Outside entities, including helping organizations, on
the other hand, are transient, unknown and cannot appre-
ciate the cultural intricacies of the community.
Perhaps it is Jasper’s rural isolation that led the com-
munity to be largely self-sufﬁcient, but for whatever reason,
a group of leaders from many sectors within the community
rose up and reached out to each other after the murder. The
result was something of an organic uniﬁcation of purpose,
centering on the well-being and autonomy of their com-
munity. One leader recalled this commitment, ‘‘There were
a lot of people that stepped up to the plate that said this is
not going to ruin our community. We will not let it ruin our
community’’. What is most impressive is the cooperative
manner in which this was accomplished. Several social
institutions formed something of a loose and informal
committee, contributing their own unique strengths and
functions toward this objective. Each acted at the request of
the others, and all contributed their support toward the
common goals. This coordination was purposeful and cal-
culated, but this rarely came about through formal planning
meetings or some pre-determined master plan.
While community institutions like the Jasper County
Sheriff and other formal and informal organizations played
signiﬁcant roles during the crisis, one social agent evolved
very quickly as the hub from which all other institutions,
like spokes, connected. The Ministerial Alliance interacted
very closely and became a consulting agent to law
enforcement, the city, and business sectors. A critical ele-
ment of these primary social institutions was their prox-
imity to the community. Leaders from the church
interacted on a personal basis with the community. While
agencies and individuals from outside the community
entered Jasper, the citizens took their cues for behavior
from these local and trusted institutions. This may be why a
Black resident of Jasper was more apt to respond in
alignment with a white minister from his small local con-
gregation than to join with the NAACP or Black Panthers.
The Ministerial Alliance framed the issue, not as race
against race, but as Jasper (citizens of both races) against
forces from outside the community—literally Jasper
against the world (special interest groups, the media, as
well as non-animate elements such as racism, cultural
norms, etc.). If not for strong leaders with purposeful
efforts to maintain control of the debate, outside elements
could have transformed the Byrd murder into a racial
spectacle and embroiled the town in a clash of black citizen
against white citizen. The ramiﬁcations of such would be
signiﬁcant in degree and duration. Instead, the opposite
occurred. Citizens of both races joined together in response
to concerted efforts by community leaders (also of both
races) to oppose extra-community threats.
No one better understood the Jasper community than the
local leaders, and Jasper determined that the community
possessed the answers to its own crisis. Thus, the solutions
were found from sources within the community rather than
from sources outside. This comports with the experience
following natural disasters where victims are frequently
their own best rescuers (Dynes and Drabek 1994; Wenger
1985). Extreme events, disasters and traumas draw a host
of experts, helpers and agencies with knowledge and good
intentions (Gist et al. 1998). The community of Jasper
received these with suspicion and ﬁrmly sent them away,
relying instead on their own abilities.
The Role of Media
The effect of the media transformed what very likely
would have been just another local tragedy affecting a few
families into an international event that provided a stage
for opposing interest groups. The media made the story
and placed themselves squarely in the middle of the
community trauma; they were active participants. The
effect of the media cannot be overstated. Mass media
coverage of major negative community events expands
their impact geographically (Wright et al. 1990). As future
communities face traumatic situations, they must account
for the inﬂuence of and imposition of the media (Hawkins
et al. 2004).
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objective reporting institution and more like an interest
group pursing a deﬁnite objective. Indeed, the media
appeared to have an agenda to achieve ratings by means of
sensationalism, focusing on the dramatic, the atypical and
failing to discuss less ‘‘sexy’’ subtleties. This occurs partly
from a need to highlight the extraordinary instead of the
mundane and modal reality and partially from a lack of
knowledge of the cultural speciﬁcs, the zeitgeist, history
and sophisticated intricacies of the community. It is
impossible for a media team to come into a community or
situation foreign to them and digest all the relevant infor-
mation necessary for a thoughtful analysis in the span of
2 days, much less 2 weeks or 2 months.
Crisis, extreme events and disasters are situations that
inherently tend to draw out the weaknesses and short-
comings of the media. Communities ﬁnding themselves at
the center of such circumstances are likely to be over-
whelmed with the primary events and not equipped or
knowledgeable to respond to the media effects, which can
become a crisis of its own accord. In many ways a com-
munity may ﬁnd itself involved in two disasters, one the
original event and the second a creation by the media.
Jasper quickly recognized the absurdity of controlling the
media and sought instead a strategy of management or
accommodation. This was not accomplished by surrender
but by strategically establishing boundaries of appropriate
time, place and topic. Communities must have a plan of
action prior to the onset of a crisis on how to manage the
media. This includes individuals or agencies that will act as
information gatekeepers—individuals who are privy to the
most accurate information and who are adept at speaking.
These individuals must have the skills not only to convey
information but also the emotive tone the community
wishes to portray.
Blaming, division and anger are common responses by
victims and victim’s families after social and natural crises,
and social support often deteriorates over time (Kaniasty
and Norris 1993, 1995). In Jasper, the opposite occurred.
This was not a matter of chance; several factors apparently
facilitated a more amiable and healthy relationship between
victims’ families and community institutions. Responses
from interviews identify several key factors to establishing
quality and supportive relationships: frank, open and pro-
active communication, involvement of the highest level
ofﬁcials instead of messengers, personal visits made to the
families, and an immediate response. Communication with
and support for the families took place as soon as accurate
information conﬁrmed the victimization of their family
member.
Whether speaking of large social institutions like the
conglomerate of churches or the smallest and most fun-
damental like the Byrd family, the pre-existence of
sufﬁcient social ties, working experience, trust, and a sense
of the common good are essential if a community is to
successfully manage a disaster or crisis. If organizations
are not familiar with the assets, the capacities and the
values of each other, the confusion and natural out-group
distrust will severely limit an effective response. It is
noteworthy that this working level of social capital was
possessed by organizations beyond the traditional public
service providers (police, ﬁre and city/government). These
organizations had relationships with educational, faith
based, business, local media and other prominent segments
or local groups. Disasters and crises affect a community
ecologically. Responses that simply target food, health and
shelter are necessary but not sufﬁcient for long-term social
well-being.
Cultural Distinctiveness of Communities
Every community has something of a culture unique to
itself. This includes its speciﬁc history, legacy, geography,
racial and ethnic composition, as well as individual gov-
ernment, economics and demographic qualities. In Jasper,
this unique community culture came into play during the
unfolding of and reaction to the social disaster. When a
disaster or trauma occurs in any locale, the threat is per-
ceived from a culturally-speciﬁc lens and the response is
informed by cultural, political and social speciﬁcs. Jasper’s
response is categorically different than if the same event
transpired in Detroit. As a Black Jasper resident explained,
‘‘You have to be a resident of Jasper to really understand
why we didn’t respond with violence’’.
Just as it is imperative to understand an individual’s
unique psychological characteristics before prescribing a
treatment, it is equally necessary to understand the unique
qualities—the culture—of a community before prescribing
a course of action. Communities have different leadership
structures, social institutions, limitations and assets, and
protocols for facing challenges. Each has its own future as
well, a trajectory that will be affected by the manner in
which it responds to a traumatic event.
This point is clearly illustrated by the primary social
institution that took the lead in Jasper: the Ministerial
Alliance emerged as the major organizer for the commu-
nity response. Beyond Jasper, every community has its own
primary social institution. In some communities this might
be law enforcement or the military, while in other com-
munities these institutions may be shrouded with distrust
and scandal. The particular response to a community wide
trauma in each of these communities will take a different
course. As future disasters strike communities, a conscious
understanding of their speciﬁc community culture must be
considered as an important element of an effort in the
process of community healing and well-being.
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Jasper experienced tremendous pressures and marshaled
socialassetswhenfacinganunexpectedandsudden crisis.It
exhibited remarkable resilience and mobilized primary
social organizations, sometimes in unique ways, to confront
a multifaceted social disaster. Pre-existing intra-community
relationships between individuals and organizations were
vital for the community’s successful response. The com-
munity engaged in a process of self-analysis that eventuated
inastrongdeclarationofcommunityvalues,beliefsandself-
deﬁnition.
The process, procedures and ultimate responses of Jas-
per provides several effective guidelines that can be
applied to other communities that ﬁnd themselves involved
in a similar social crisis, whether that crisis is an element of
a natural, technological or terrorist event, or is the result of
unique social conditions. The following are recommenda-
tions for effective response to community trauma/social
disaster:
1. Communication: Quickly establish open and frank
communication with those within the effected popu-
lations. Dispel rumors and misinformation.
2. Local leadership and management of the event: The
response to the event should be facilitated by the most
natural, established and known leaders. These individ-
uals and organizations are most familiar with the
culture, unique needs and potential solutions to
evolving problems. They also provide a sense of
stability and have a level of trust with victims.
3. Clear and agreed objectives. Disasters are not times of
opportunity for pursuing special agendas. All entities
involved in the response, especially the leadership,
should have a very speciﬁc agenda motivating their
actions.
4. Handle the media—win the media: Recognize that the
media will mischaracterize the event and the conse-
quences due to their tendency towards sensationalism.
Set clear boundaries for the media and provide
accurate background information. It is better to have
the media as allies rather than adversaries.
Future Directions
Thestudyofdisaster,crisisandextremeeventshasincreased
innumberandimportanceduetotheuniqueexperiencesofa
post-September 11 reality, as well as the devastating expe-
riences of Gulf Coast hurricanes. Other less traditional
disasters, such as the massacres at Columbine High School
and Virginia Polytechnic University, indicate a need to
understand extreme events, especially their community
effects, through a more ecological perspective. The present
research, in trying to conceive of the community rather than
theindividualasthesubjectofstudy,uncoveredanumberof
important issues worthy of future research.
Our ﬁndings illustrate the need to be sensitive to the
important changes (relationships, self-analysis, mobiliza-
tion of resources, interdependence of social organizations,
etc.) taking place within the community—the social ele-
ments of the response—but not necessarily evident through
usual indicators such as destroyed infrastructure, economic
impact, and medical aid. Certainly the social elements have
a direct relationship with the factors traditionally accounted
for in a disaster scenario; surely these interact with one
another, but the present research illustrates the need to
consider these social elements in a more prominent way
than usual by responders, researchers and policy makers.
The present study also underscores the value of
employing both quantitative and qualitative methods in
examining the impact of a disaster on a community and
demonstrates how both ﬁndings can be used to provide
greater explanatory value beyond the ability of one or the
other individually. The results identiﬁed by each method
aided in achieving the comprehensive, ecological objec-
tives of the study. Even when statistical and interview
analyses identiﬁed similar ﬁndings, the insight provided by
each method beneﬁted greatly from conﬁrmation and
elaboration of the other. For example, economic changes
identiﬁed by DD statistical analysis were conﬁrmed and
elaborated upon by responses of community members.
Interviewees identiﬁed, from personal experience, the
impact, the timeline, the causes and the effect of these
changes. This multi-disciplinary and multi-methodological
approach is necessary in light of the complexity of the
event and the sophistication of a community level analysis.
The present study also suggests a need to more fully
understand the role of social capital preceding a commu-
nity crisis, during the response, and as an outcome of the
response. It asked an important question that could have
important policy, as well as ﬁnancial, ramiﬁcations: Is it
possible to measure the impact of an extreme event on a
community? If so, what are the appropriate measures to
ensure proper evaluation? Finally, are those measures
available in smaller communities, the majority of which
do not participate in national, longitudinal surveys?
Researchers are beginning to wrestle with these concepts
and ecological analysis. Recently, Norris et al. (2008)
argued that community resilience following a disaster
should be conceptualized as a complex system resting on
four networked ‘‘adaptive capacities’’, including economic
development, social capital, information and communica-
tion, and community competence.
Many important questions arise that were not within the
parameters of this research. Are there differences between
the effective responses of small communities like Jasper
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aspects of community that lead to a healthier or a mal-
adaptive response? What effect does traditional disaster
response have on the creation or severity of the ‘‘second
disaster’’ stage identiﬁed in natural disaster research (e.g.,
Raphael 1986)? These questions become very relevant in a
world where natural disasters are frequent and the tech-
nological advances and social dynamics of the world make
extreme events more personal, even if geographically
located hundreds of miles away. Future investigation
will further explore how the advent and evolution of
media itself transforms how disasters and extreme events
affect us and how we respond to affected individuals and
communities.
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